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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 75 million adults were born during the “Baby Boom”
years between 1946 and 1964 in the United States alone.1 Over
the next nineteen years, approximately 10,000 people will retire each
day from full-time employment.2 Many of these individuals will seek the
advice of financial institutions and advisors to help with management
of their retirement assets. This influx of individuals in need of financial
advice requires an increased risk of investors receiving advice that is not
necessarily in their best interest. The federal government has taken
proactive steps over the years to protect retirement investors
through various forms of legislation.3 In April 2016, the Department
of Labor (DOL) proposed their Fiduciary Rule, which raised the
standard that those providing financial retirement advice are to be held.4
1. Glenn Kessler, Do 10,000 Baby Boomers Retire Every Day?, WASH. POST (July 24, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/07/24/do-10000-baby-boomersretire-every-day/?utm_term=.d400412327a8 [https://perma.cc/T5ZS-N5XN].
2. Id.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1978).
4. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
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While the DOL intended to create a uniform code of conduct among
financial professionals, the rule was ultimately vacated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.5 In the wake of this decision, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a new standard
(known as “Regulation Best Interest”)6 that is sure to leave retirement
investors with the obligation of successfully navigating the state court
system to seek redress against those who violate the standard.
This Comment, in Part I, provides an overview of the DOL’s Fiduciary
Rule, the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest, and the potential impact these
rules have on consumer litigation claims against financial professionals and
institutions. Part II provides a history of the retirement advice industry,
with a focus on the development of the primary methods of saving for
retirement, including defined benefit and defined contribution plans, as well
as accounts falling under the “individual responsibility model.” Part III
discusses the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19747 and the
role preemptive language in the legislation had in attempting to create a
uniform national standard of conduct for plan fiduciaries. Part IV
encompasses a review of the Fiduciary Rule’s key provisions defining the
new fiduciary standard,8 the Best Interest Contract Exemption,9 and the
fiduciary contract. Part V examines not only the impact of the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruling in Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler,10 whereby the DOL did not create a federal
private right of action for consumers, but also the vacating of the Fiduciary
Rule.11 In light of the Fifth Circuit decision, Part VI provides an in-depth
review of the SEC’s proposed rule, Regulation Best Interest.12 Parts VII
5. Infra Part V.
6. Infra Part VI.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
8. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946.
9. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
10. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D. Tex. 2017), rev’d
on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018).
11. See id. at 181, 183 (holding a federal private right of action was not created under the Rule);
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacating
the lower court decision in Hugler).
12. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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and VIII provide a discussion of state common law and statutory causes of
action that may be brought by consumers to recover for breaches of the
best interest standard.
II. HISTORY OF THE RETIREMENT ADVICE INDUSTRY
A. Growth of the Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and “Individual
Responsibility Model”
Planning for retirement has been an important concern in the United
States since the nation’s founding.13 As a result of the American Civil War,
a military pension system was developed to help support veterans and their
families cope with life after service.14 During the Great Depression, the
United States government enacted Social Security—expanding federal
retirement benefits to all citizens.15 Following World War II, and in
conjunction with the post-war boom, Americans started to grasp the
importance of having a plan for retirement as part of their employee benefit
packages.16
The defined benefit plan was the traditional means by which postwar
Americans saved for their retirement.17 This concept gained in popularity
during the 1940s, with nearly 25% of private sector workers participating.18
Under a traditional defined benefit plan arrangement, assets contributed by
either employers or employees are pooled in a single account, with the
13. See Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html [https://perma.cc/KY9J-5Z53] (noting Thomas
Paine after the Revolutionary War called for a social insurance system to be developed as a means to
prevent poverty in old-age).
14. See id. (explaining disabled veterans, widows, and orphans were entitled to government
benefits).
15. See id. (describing the development of the Social Security program in the United States).
16. See JUSTIN OWENS & JOSHUA BARBASH, RUSSELL INVS. RES., DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS:
A BRIEF HISTORY 3 (2014), https://russellinvestments.com/-/media/files/us/insights/institutions/
defined-benefit/defined-benefit-plans-a-brief-history.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/NC6W-U7NZ]
(“In 1948, a National Labor Relations Board decision set the stage for a boom in private sector
pensions plans. The decision allowed pension benefits to be part of union negotiations . . . .”); Liz
Davidson, The History of Retirement Benefits, WORKFORCE (June 21, 2016), www.workforce.com/
2016/06/21/the-history-of-retirement-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/CP7K-W73J] (“The idea that
employees should have some kind of a defined benefit in retirement gained traction during the boom
decades that followed World War II.”).
17. See OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 2 (“[Defined benefit] plans were the retirement
benefit of choice, covering almost half the private sector workforce in the U.S.”).
18. See id. at 3 (“Pension coverage (percentage of private sector workers participating in [defined
benefit] plans) increased from 15% to 25%, and plan contributions tripled in the 1940s alone.”).
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understanding that the employee will be able to receive a fixed income
payment at retirement.19 Throughout the 1950s, plan participation
increased to 41% of private sector workers with $57 billion in assets saved.20
Participation in defined benefit plans remained level for the next two
decades, especially after the passage of legislative fixes to address problems
with the plans.21 As popularity waned, a new type of plan, the defined
contribution plan, became the preferred method of saving for retirement.22
With the defined contribution framework, employers and employees
contribute to an account dedicated to the employee.23 The employee is
subsequently entitled to whatever assets are in the account at retirement.24
Congress, through a series of amendments to the Revenue Act of 1978,
created the 401(k) plan—the most commonly used retirement account for
employees today.25 In the nearly forty years since enactment of the 401(k),
over $5.1 trillion has accumulated in plans for more than 54 million
American employees.26

19. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (detailing how defined benefit
plans function with the employer assuming all investment and funding risk).
20. OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 3.
21. See id. at 5 (noting 45% participation in 1970 and 46% in 1980). Compare Colleen E. Medill,
The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY
L.J. 1, 16 (2000) (explaining the purpose of passing ERISA in 1974 was to address problems with
defined benefit plans), with Davidson, supra note 16 (observing the Revenue Act of 1978 shifted
employee focus from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans).
22. See OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 5 (“In the first two decades after the passage of
ERISA, the number of employees covered by [defined contribution] plans tripled, from about
20 million to over 60 million . . . .”).
23. Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 439.
24. See id. (“‘[U]nder such plans, by definition, there can never be an insufficiency of funds in
the plan to cover promised benefits,’ since each beneficiary is entitled to whatever assets are dedicated
to his individual account.” (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359
(1980))).
25. The Revenue Act of 1978 detailed three criteria that established the modern day 401(k) plan:
(1) employers may make contributions on behalf of employees; (2) distribution of plan assets may
generally occur after reaching fifty-nine and one-half years of age, death, or separation from service;
and (3) employee rights are nonforfeitable. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135,
92 Stat. 2763, 2785 (codified at I.R.C. § 401(k)); see also Medill, supra note 21, at 7 (detailing the origins
of the modern 401(k) plan).
26. Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plan Research, INV. COMPANY INST.,
https://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [https://perma.cc/27KL-JK86]; see
also Medill, supra note 21, at 8 (highlighting the rise in the number of 401(k) plans between 1984 and
1993 from 17,303 to 154,527 respectively, with 23 million American employees participating by 1993).
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Throughout the 1980s, Congress passed additional legislation allowing
employees further flexibility in determining how to save for retirement.27
The availability of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) gave employees
the freedom to direct their assets to an array of investment options while
allowing them to have benefits that exist within a consolidated account
balance.28 The “individual responsibility model,” created through
congressional legislation, has transferred the responsibility of having a
working financial knowledge of investments to employees.29 In reality, a
large percentage of the working population does not possess the knowledge
necessary to make informed decisions about their retirement savings
plans.30 Critics suggest this knowledge gap may create a scenario where
more employees are likely to fail in their retirement plans.31
27. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 states in part, “In the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the qualified retirement contributions of the
individual for the taxable year.” Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 219(a),
95 Stat. 172, 274; see OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16 (“In 1981, Congress began allowing employees
to set up Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs—first introduced with ERISA), even if they were
already covered under an employer-sponsored plan, and expanded Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs).”).
28. See OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 5 (“Employees liked their discretion over
investment options, the portability of benefits and the simplicity of benefits being defined as an account
balance.”).
29. See Medill, supra note 21, at 16 (“Given the emphasis placed by the individual responsibility
model[,] . . . it is particularly important for plan participants to be informed of the relative historical
returns among basic investment options offered in participant-directed plans.”).
30. According to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), employees should do
the following when participating in a 401(k) plan: (1) understand the fees paid to the plan; (2) track
investment performance on a regular basis; (3) review account statements on at least a quarterly basis;
and (4) seek outside advice whenever necessary. Managing Your 401(k), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
investors/managing-your-401k [https://perma.cc/2SW2-WWP7]; see Medill, supra note 21, at 15–16
(noting 55% of employees had moderate financial knowledge and 11% had little to no knowledge);
Jonas Elmerraji, Retirement Planning: Introduction, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.investopedia.com/university/retirement/ [https://perma.cc/YS9E-25JR] (emphasizing
the importance of understanding asset allocation, how much retirement savings is necessary, and the
tax implications of participating in a retirement plan).
31. See Medill, supra note 21, at 14 (“[M]any participants suffer from financial ‘illiteracy.’ As a
result, they make decisions that place them at risk of failing to accumulate adequate savings for
retirement.”); David H. Bailey & Jonathan M. Borwein, How Financially Literate is the Investing Public?,
HUFFPOST (July 29, 2014, 11:16 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-h-bailey/howfinancially-literate-investing-public_b_5625649.html [https://perma.cc/9D32-7ZX3] (“The trouble is,
most individual investors are not sufficiently well-informed on financial matters, and thus make lessthan-optimal choices in managing their retirement.”); OFFICE OF INV’R. EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, THE
FACTS ON SAVINGS AND INVESTING: EXCERPTS FROM RECENT POLLS AND STUDIES
HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL EDUCATION 7 (Apr. 1999), https://www.sec.gov/
pdf/report99.pdf [https://perma.cc/P367-VFQF] (“Too many Americans don’t know how to manage
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B. The 2008 Financial Crisis
The United States witnessed one of its largest declines in investor wealth
during the 2008 Financial Crisis when 401(k)s and IRAs lost close to
$2.4 trillion in value.32 In addition, pension accounts—traditionally
thought of as more conservative in nature—lost between $1 trillion and
$2 trillion.33 Not only did these losses have immediate impact on
individuals who invested their retirement savings in the financial markets,
but they also affected the long-term financial stability of employees.34
Recognizing a need to address flaws within the financial markets,
President Barack Obama and Congress sought a fix to better protect
consumers.35
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in
2010 provided the initial response desired by consumers to protect them
from financial sales practices that, in part, led to the loss of trillions of dollars

their retirement funds and don’t realize the consequences—such as tax liabilities and other penalties—
of failing to do so.”).
32. Teresa Ghilarducci, The Recession Hurt Americans’ Retirement Accounts More Than Anybody Knew,
ATLANTIC, (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/the-recessionhurt-americans-retirement-accounts-more-than-everyone-thought/410791/ [https://perma.cc/L287A2YK].
33. Ruth Mantell, Pensions Suffering in Financial Crisis, MKT. WATCH (Oct. 7, 2008, 6:36 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pension-funds-take-1-trillion-hit-in-wake-of-financial-crisis
[https://perma.cc/HPV4-ET92].
34. See Ghilarducci, supra note 32 (“And if current trends continue between 2013 and 2022, the
number of poor or near-poor will increase by 146[%]. These numbers are unlikely to change as long
as retirement accounts are exposed to the fluctuations of financial markets and their uneven
recoveries.”); Mantell, supra note 33 (“Teresa Ghilarducci, an economic-policy analysis professor at the
New School for Social Research, said there is a long-run retirement crisis, and cited data that about
half of workers will not have enough income after [sixty-five] to replace 70% of preretirement
income.”).
35. During the signing ceremony of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act in 2010, President Barack Obama remarked, “Soon after taking office, I proposed a set
of reforms to empower consumers and investors, to bring the shadowy deals that caused the crisis into
the light of day, and to put a stop to taxpayer bailouts once and for all.” Brady Dennis, Obama Signs
Financial Overhaul Into Law, WASH. POST (July 22, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072100512.html [https://perma.cc/E9ZV-AZPL]; see
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (legislating regulatory reform of financial institutions, markets, and various governmental
agencies).
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in wealth from “The Great Recession.”36 Within the legislation, Congress
also established the Consumer Protection Finance Board (CFPB), an
organization designed to enhance and ensure compliance with federal
consumer protection laws.37 While the Board was to exist as a separate
entity from other federal agencies, its creation signaled to investors that the
federal government was prepared to empower other departments to review
those regulations impacting consumers of financial products.
III. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) for the purpose of addressing issues over defined benefit plans
administered by employers.38 The intent behind ERISA was to reform the
private pension marketplace by protecting workers from poor fiduciary
practices and underfunded plans that resulted in a loss of benefits.39
36. The opening paragraph of the Act states its purpose: “[t]o promote the financial stability of
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, . . . to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” 124 Stat. at 1376; see also
David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/summaryof-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/84BC-MGM7] (“The Act seeks to
mitigate the systemic risk of financial collapse through several legislative and regulatory initiatives . . .
[t]he Council will be required to meet at least once each quarter and will monitor U.S. financial markets
in order to identify systemic financial risks . . . .”).
37. § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2018)). The Act specifically
states, “[t]here is established in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau to be known as the
‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’, which shall regulate the offering and provision of
consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” Id. § 1011(a).
38. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1978)., (declaring
that the purpose of the Act is to protect “the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries”); Medill, supra note 21, at 4 (“Congress enacted ERISA to correct well-publicized
flaws in the traditional employer-controlled defined benefit plan.”).
39. Section 2(a) of the Act states:
[T]hat owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their
operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for
the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans . . . .
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2(a); see also Medill, supra note 21, at 4 (describing
the issues Congress intended to resolve through implementation of the legislation); ERISA at 40: Four
Decades of Protecting America’s Employee Benefits, U.S. DEP’T. LAB., https://www.dol.gov/featured/
erisa40/historical [https://perma.cc/9MXQ-67NM] (“ERISA established standards for private sector
pension, health and other employee benefits, increasing protections for plan participants and their
families.”); OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 3 (“Many pension funds were poorly funded, vesting
in benefits still took decades (up to 30 years); embezzlement of plan assets were not uncommon.”).
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Additionally, it placed the Department of Labor in charge of interpreting
and enforcing provisions that “govern the conduct of plan fiduciaries, the
investment and protection of plan assets, the reporting and disclosure of
plan information, and participants’ benefit rights and responsibilities.”40
ERISA established an important provision for plan participants, the
right to hold plan fiduciaries liable for breach of a fiduciary duty.41 ERISA
provides a uniform federal remedy for beneficiaries of any employer
sponsored plan due to preemption language detailed in section 1132(a).42
The preemption power stated in section 1132(a) is sweeping in nature,
as it extends beyond employer-sponsored retirement plans to include
even insurance benefits offered to employees.43 Congress deemed the
abuses taking place in the employer benefit plan marketplace to be of such
national importance that it intended to make ERISA a matter of “federal
concern,” paving the way for federal courts to hear cases impacted by the
40. Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-consumer [https://
perma.cc/U28W-UQQ7].
41. ERISA’s provision states:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities,
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary,
and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 409(a); see also Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs,
supra note 40 (explaining plan participants have the right to sue fiduciaries for breach of a plan fiduciary
duty).
42. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502. Section 502(e)(1) legislates the
following right of preemption: “Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section the district
courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this title brought by
the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.” Id. § 502(e)(1); see also Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200 (2004) (“Because its purpose is to provide a uniform regulatory regime,
ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, such as ERISA § 502(a)’s integrated enforcement
mechanism, which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation is ‘exclusively a federal
concern.’” (quoting Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981))); see Milby v.
MCMC, LLC., 844 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2016) (highlighting the use of ERISA to create “uniform
national standards for plan administration.” (quoting Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 208)); Young v. Verizon,
615 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting plan standards ERISA attempted to make uniform).
43. See Ramirez v Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff’s
state insurance claims were preempted by ERISA as those insurance benefits were part of an employee
benefit plan).
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legislation.44 As a result, ERISA created stability within the pension
industry by consolidating oversight and regulation under one statutory
framework.45
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FIDUCIARY RULE
A. Defining the Fiduciary Standard
The Department of Labor’s Fiduciary Rule was finalized in April 2016
and comprised of three separate regulations altering ERISA.46 As written,
the Fiduciary Rule was designed to address the growing conflict between
how financial professionals are compensated and the quality of advice
received by consumers.47
The Department of Labor believed the lack of disclosure of conflicts of
interest by financial professionals placed consumers, particularly retirement
investors, at a significant disadvantage.48 Specifically, the recommendation
by investment advisors to rollover monies from ERISA-sponsored plans to
IRAs resulted in retirement investors losing billions of dollars per year in
fees and investment results.49 Initial definitions within ERISA classified an
individual who provided advice “on a regular basis” as a “fiduciary.”50 This
44. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 511 (1978))
(explaining Congress desired to enforce pension law under federal rather than state regulations).
45. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (“The policy choices reflected in
the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants were free to obtain remedies under state law that
Congress rejected in ERISA.”); cf Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S.
1, 25–26 (1983) (holding state causes of action “not of central concern to the federal statute” are not
necessarily removable to federal court).
46. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2016)
(highlighting the purpose of the rule was to clarify what constitutes a conflict of interest in the
retirement investment advice industry).
47. See Thomas C. Graves, DOL Final Fiduciary Rule; Best Interest Contract Exemption or Level Fee
Fiduciary Exemption from the Perspective of Advisers and Financial Institutions, HAYNES BENEFITS PC,
http://www.haynesbenefits.com/admin/uploads/DOL%20Final%20Fiduciary%20Rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68T4-HE4E] (“The DOL believes that many investment professionals,
consultants, brokers, insurance agents and other advisers operate within compensation structures that
are misaligned with their customer’s interests and they often create strong incentives to steer customers
into particular investment products.”).
48. See id. (“These conflicts of interest do not always have to be disclosed.”).
49. Id.
50. The 1975 definition of a fiduciary developed by the Department of Labor was written as:
Renders any advice described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section on a regular basis to the plan
pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding, written or otherwise, between
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definition narrowed the interpretation as to who may qualify as a fiduciary
from a legal perspective.51 With a narrower definition in place, financial
professionals could avoid a fiduciary classification by stating their advice was
not of an ongoing nature.52 Furthermore, advisors could also claim the
advice was merely incidental to the service they provided and did not serve
as the sole motivating factor to the final investment decision by the
consumer.53
To address the issue of advice “on a regular basis,” the Department of
Labor simply dropped this language from its proposed rule change.54 With
the elimination of the regular basis standard, the concept of a fiduciary
within the financial services industry has been broadened to include various
types of advisor-client interactions, including not only ongoing advice but
one-time transactional interactions as well. It is this new definition of
“fiduciary” the financial industry now contests.

such person and the plan or a fiduciary with respect to the plan that such services will serve as a
primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that such person will render
individualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan regarding
such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio
composition, or diversification of plan investments.
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 40 Fed. Reg. 50,842, 50,843 (Oct. 31, 1975) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510 (1975)); see also Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 163
(N.D. Tex. 2017) (detailing the Department of Labor established a five-part test to determine how an
individual could qualify as a fiduciary), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed
Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 6 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Prior to the promulgation of the new rules[,] . . . the
governing regulations defined a ‘fiduciary,’ in relevant part, as someone who renders investment advice
‘on a regular basis . . . .’” (first citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21 (2015); then citing 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975–9
(2015))).
51. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 13 (D.D.C. 2016) (“As a legal matter,
the Department asserted that the 1975 regulation had ‘significantly narrow[ed] the plain language of’
the statutory definition of a ‘fiduciary.’” (citing Definition of the Term Fiduciary, 75 Fed. Reg 65,263
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510))).
52. See Greg Iacurci, How Will the DOL Enforce its Fiduciary Rule?, INV. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016,
2:07 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160412/FREE/160419977/how-will-the-dolenforce-its-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/6J5X-Z3GC] (“Until the Labor Department’s fiduciary
rule, proving a broker was a fiduciary with an obligation to act in a client’s best interest was difficult—
brokers could easily skirt taking on fiduciary status by claiming their advice wasn’t continuous . . . .”).
53. See id. (detailing how an investment advisor could avoid a fiduciary responsibility to a client).
54. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 6 (“The first new rule . . . modifies the
definition of ‘fiduciary’ by, among other things, dropping the condition that the relevant investment
advice be provided on a ‘regular basis.’”).
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in National
Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez,55 heard one of the first challenges to the
updated “fiduciary” definition as it related to the annuity industry.56
National Association for Fixed Annuities claimed an individual providing
financial advice can only do so on a regular basis, and since their business
model was focused on one-time transactions, they were exempt from the
new definition.57 The court found, however, that the act of providing
investment advice to consumers was a universal act, regardless if it was
ongoing or one-time.58
While the case before the district court in National Ass’n for Fixed Annuities
was one of first impression regarding the Department of Labor Fiduciary
Rule, its position on the nature of advice appears to be taking hold in other
federal districts.59 The Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Texas in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Hugler,60 reiterated that the
statutory language of ERISA did not suggest investment advice was to be
only viewed as advice given on a “regular basis.”61 Building on this
foundation, the court explained advice regarding important financial
decisions could also include those transactions occurring on a one-time
basis.62 With its holding in Hugler, the district court established that any
55. Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016).
56. See id. at 21–22 (claiming the “regular basis” standard for advice must be retained because
the sale of an annuity contract is a one-time transaction that was never intended to be covered under
original ERISA language).
57. See id. at 23 (“As NAFA stresses, for over thirty years the Department used its five-part test
to determine whether a person ‘renders investment advice’ to a plan or IRA, and . . . that test limited
the reach of ERISA . . . prohibited transaction rules to those who render advice ‘on a regular basis.’”
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21(c)(1) (2015)).
58. See id. (stating from a plain reading of the statutory language there is nothing to suggest
investment advice was only intended to be viewed as ongoing).
59. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 168 (N.D. Tex. 2017)
(declaring the Department of Labor has authority to define key terms within ERISA), rev’d on other
grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); see generally Mkt. Synergy Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 16CV-4083DDC-KGS, 2016 WL 6948061, at *30 (D. Kan. Nov. 28, 2016) (“The DOL has determined that the
rule changes will benefit retirement investors throughout the United States by requiring investment
advisers to act in the best interest of those investors.”).
60. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 168 (N.D. Tex. 2017),
rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018);
61. See id. at 171 (affirming an ongoing relationship is not required for someone to provide
investment advice under ERISA); see also Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (noting
the “regular basis” standard is no longer applicable to the current marketplace of financial advice).
62. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 171 n.64 (“Given that one time transactions such as rollovers
can be the most important decision an investor makes, such transactions are both meaningful and
substantial.”).
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individual who provides retirement advice is now subject to a fiduciary
standard, regardless of the existence of an ongoing relationship.63
B. The Best Interest Contract Exemption
With the development of the Fiduciary Rule, certain transactions effected
by financial professionals are now considered prohibited unless they qualify
for relief under the Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE 84–24).64
Acknowledging financial professionals are compensated through a number
of methods, such as by fee or commission, PTE 84–24 was designed to
allow these professionals to continue advising on various financial
instruments, provided the compensation received was reasonable.65
Recognizing enhanced regulation could prevent consumers from accessing
certain types of financial products, the Department of Labor introduced the

63. See Encino Motorcars, LLC. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“Agencies are free to
change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.” (citing
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–84 (1984))); Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d
at 175 (stating the definition of a fiduciary under the Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule is within
“reasonable interpretation under ERISA”).
64. PTE 84–24 states the following:
In addition, the Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to grant administrative exemptions
under ERISA and the Code on an individual or class basis, but only if the Secretary first finds
that the exemptions are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of plans and their
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and (3) protective of the rights of the participants
and beneficiaries of such plans and IRA owners. Accordingly, while fiduciary advisers may always
give advice without need of an exemption if they avoid the sorts of conflicts of interest that result
in prohibited transactions, when they choose to give advice in which they have a financial interest,
they must rely upon an exemption.
Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84–24 for Certain
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies,
and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,147, 21,151(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
65. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (“Relief under PTE 84–24 was conditional . . . and that
‘[t]he combined total of all fees, commissions and other consideration received by the insurance agent
or broker . . . is not in excess of ‘reasonable compensation’ under ERISA and the Code.” (quoting
Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84–24 for Certain
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies,
and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,147 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550))).
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Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE).66
Under the BICE, those who give advice on retirement-specific accounts
may be able to receive compensation that would traditionally be prohibited
under PTE 84–24.67 There are five distinct conditions a provider of advice
must adhere to in order to qualify for this more stringent exemption.68
First, any individual or company holding themselves out as an advisor to a
retirement investor is required to state they are acting in a fiduciary
capacity.69 Next, the advisor must be governed by an Impartial Conduct
Standard.70 This standard requires advisors to know their customer with
respect to their overall investment objectives and financial circumstances,
while avoiding misleading statements during the advice conversation.71
Thirdly, the BICE expressly states the need for policies to be in place to
prevent abuses of the Impartial Conduct Standard.72 Additionally, advisors
cannot be incentivized to make retirement recommendations that are not in
their customer’s best interest.73 Finally, all fees and forms of compensation
must be disclosed to the consumer.74
C. The Fiduciary Contract
In order to formalize the fiduciary relationship under the BICE, the
financial advisor, institution, and client must all enter into a written
contract.75 The contract must contain language stipulating the five
66. Best Interest Contract Exemption, supra note 9; see generally Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities,
217 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (highlighting the sale of a commission based product could subject that product
to the restrictions of PTE 84–24).
67. See Graves, supra note 47 (explaining the role of the BICE in compensating those who give
advice to retirement investors).
68. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (“However, BICE proposed stricter conditions to
securing an exemption from the prohibited transactions than did PTE 84–24.”).
69. Id. at 167.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 165.
75. See Mkt. Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 16-CV-4083-DDC-KGS, 2016 WL
6948061, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 28, 2016) (“To apply, the BICE would require a ‘Financial Institution’
(as defined in the proposed BICE) and the adviser to acknowledge fiduciary status by contract . . . .”);
NAIFA Fact Sheet: DOL Expands Fiduciary Definition, NAIFA, http://www.naifa.org/NAIFA/media/
GovRel/issuefed/NAIFA-DOL-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6M8-KR4U] (outlining the
necessity of a written contract to satisfy the BICE); see also Graves, supra note 47, at 3 (“An IRA other
or non-ERISA Plan must enter into an enforceable written contract with the Financial Institution that
acknowledges fiduciary status for itself and its Advisers.”).
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conditions for meeting the BICE detailed by the Hugler court.76 For those
investors who have an existing, ongoing relationship with a financial advisor,
an amendment to the existing contract is sufficient.77 In addition, the
financial institution must make express warranties stating the institution is
in compliance with Impartial Conduct Standards, has procedures in place to
prevent material conflicts of interest, and does not create special incentives
for advisors to recommend products not in the best interest of the
investor.78 While the fiduciary contract is now necessary to memorialize
the advisor-client relationship, it merely needs to be executed at the time the
account is opened and not during the initial retirement conversation.79
Once again, ERISA provides a regulatory framework for employersponsored retirement plans.80 Participants of those plans typically receive
plan documents detailing the responsibilities of the employee, employer, and
plan administrators.81 The primary role of the fiduciary contract is to
provide protection to those participating in IRAs or non-ERISA governed
retirement accounts.82 While financial advisors do periodically provide
76. See. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 167 (explaining the five conditions of the BICE); see also
Graves, supra note 47, at 3–6 (discussing language necessary to fulfill contractual requirements);
NAIFA Fact Sheet, supra note 75 (highlighting contractual requirements to be satisfied under the BICE).
77. See Graves, supra note 47, at 3 (“An alternative to executing a new contract with an IRA or
other non-ERISA Plan is to amend an existing contract to include the terms described . . . .”).
78. See The Final Rule: DOL’s Expanded Definition of Investment Advice Fiduciary Under ERISA and
Revised Complex of Exemptions, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (Apr. 12, 2016), https://us.evershedssutherland.com/portalresource/DOLFinalRulev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BK4-FP2D] (discussing
warranties existing within the contract terms); Graves, supra note 47, at 4 (listing three distinct
warranties that must be present within the contract).
79. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, supra note 9, at 21,008 (“[T]he exemption does not
require execution of the contract at the start of Retirement Investors’ conversations with Advisers, as
long as it is entered into prior to or at the same time as the recommended investment transaction.”).
80. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1978).
81. See A Plan Sponsor’s Responsibilities, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plansponsor/a-plan-sponsors-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/2G4B-2D3L] (noting plan documents
must remain in compliance with the law); Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/retirementplans-and-erisa-consumer [https://perma.cc/U28W-UQQ7] (explaining the purpose of ERISA and
the minimum amount of information necessary in plan documents to be furnished to consumers).
82. The Department of Labor stated the following in its purpose for regulatory action:
If advice is provided to an IRA investor or a non-ERISA plan, the Financial Institution must set
forth the standards of fiduciary conduct and fair dealing in an enforceable contract with the
investor. The contract creates a mechanism for IRA investors to enforce their rights and ensures
that they will have a remedy for advice that does not honor their best interest. In this way, the
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advice on ERISA-sponsored plans, they typically work with consumers
purchasing products in the retail IRA marketplace; thus, the fiduciary
contract is designed to ensure these retail consumers receive advice that is
in their best interest.83
V. HUGLER, PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION, AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
A. Hugler and the Private Right of Action Question
One of the primary concerns and sources of confusion derived from the
BICE is whether a private right of action to enforce federal law has been
created on behalf of consumers.84 Critics of the rule, mainly those
representing the financial services industry, claim the fiduciary contract will
permit consumers to bring breach of contract claims against fiduciaries.85
It is suggested that if the Fiduciary Rule does create a private right of action,
then the Department of Labor violated the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Alexander v. Sandoval,86 where only acts of Congress, and not administrative

contract gives both the individual adviser and the financial institution a powerful incentive to
ensure advice is provided in accordance with fiduciary norms, or risk litigation, including class
litigation, and liability and associated reputational risk.
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. 20,946, 20,947 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2510, 2550).
83. See id.(stating under current industry standards there are inadequate protections in place to
ensure advice received is free from conflicts of interest as most financial advisors are compensated
through a commission-based system).
84. See Paul Foley & John Sanders, Fiduciary Rule Creates Breach of Contract Claim, But No Private
Right of Action, LEXOLOGY (June 12, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9d4d
cada-155d-43c6-8020-0e74dcd5572c [https://perma.cc/M79Y-EEM2] (“The creation of a private
right of action is one of the investment industry’s chief concerns with the Fiduciary Rule.”).
85. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 181 (N.D. Tex. 2017)
(detailing the plaintiff’s claim that the Best Interest Contract Exemption and PTE 84–24 create a
private cause of action), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84
(“Industry leaders claim that the BIC exemption creates a private right of action because it enables
investors to bring breach of contract claims and class actions against the fiduciaries with whom they
contract.”); see also Nick Thornton, Labor Puts Fiduciary Rule’s Private Right of Action Under
Microscope, BENEFITS PRO (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.benefitspro.com/2017/03/15/labor-putsfiduciary-rules-private-right-of-action?page_all=1&slreturn=1508437981 [https://perma.cc/V7SGDF3L] (“The private right-of-action provision prohibits financial service firms and insurance
companies from writing class-action exclusions into the rule’s Best Interest Contract
Exemption . . . .”).
86. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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agencies, may create private rights of action to enforce federal law.87
The federal district court in Hugler addressed the private right of action
issue after the United States Chamber of Commerce claimed the Fiduciary
Rule was in direct conflict with Sandoval.88 According to the court, the
BICE and PTE 84–24 do nothing more than require written disclosures to
be added to contracts between consumers and financial institutions seeking
to qualify for the exemptions.89 Violation of these written disclosures may
result in breach of contract disputes rather than lawsuits claiming abuse of
a federal regulation.90 Although state courts typically hear breach of
contract claims, even a federal court sitting in diversity would have to apply
state contract law in order to enforce the contract’s provisions.91
Additionally, for those products used to fund retirement objectives and
governed by a contract—namely, annuities—the BICE did not change how
those contracts are enforced.92 The court further stated it is not uncommon
for regulated businesses that use written contracts to have mandatory
provisions dictated by federal regulations.93

87. See id. at 286 (holding private rights of action to enforce federal law are created through
legislative means); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (“The source of
plaintiffs’ rights must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which they seek
to enforce, not in the jurisdiction provision.” (citing Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,
424 (1975))).
88. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
89. Id.
90. See id. (“The consequence may be a lawsuit for non-compliance with the contract, but the
exemptions do not create a federal cause of action under Title II.”).
91. See id. at 181–82 (explaining state contract law determines the enforceability of a contract
regardless if a breach of contract suit is brought in state or federal court); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84
(“The judge reasoned that any lawsuit resulting from the breach of a BIC exemption contract would
be brought under state contract law rather than federal ERISA law.”); see also Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”).
92. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (“[B]ICE and the amended PTE 84–24 do not change the
enforcement regime that existed prior to the current rulemaking.” (footnote omitted)); see also Abbit v.
ING USA Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197–98 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (stating criteria
necessary to bring a breach of contract claim for an annuity contract under California state law).
93. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (noting the existing precedent of federal regulations
determining mandatory contract provisions); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84 (“The judge also noted
that it is not a new concept for federal regulations to require entities to enter into written contracts
with mandatory provisions . . . and multiple other agencies require that their regulated entities enter
into written agreements with mandatory terms.”).
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With the Hugler court pronouncing that a private right of action to enforce
federal law was not created by the Department of Labor, the burden of
enforcing the Fiduciary Rule dramatically shifted from the federal
government.94 As contemplated, the Rule did not necessarily provide for
While retirement plan
an administrative enforcement structure.95
participants have sufficient remedies available under ERISA, those
consumers saving for retirement outside of employer-sponsored plans will
need to seek redress in state court.96 What should concern retirement
investors is the consistency, or lack thereof, with which the Fiduciary Rule
will be interpreted under state law. Depending on the state and its court’s
interpretation of what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, the
Department of Labor’s desire to create a uniform code of conduct
throughout the financial services industry may face headwinds.97

94. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 184 (holding the Fiduciary Rule does not create a private right
of action); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84 (“[A]ny claims brought as a result of BIC exemption
contracts would be brought under state law rather than federal law.”).
95. See Iacurci, supra note 52 (“The Labor Department isn’t the government agency with
enforcement jurisdiction over IRAs. That responsibility falls to the Internal Revenue Service . . . .
However, the IRS ‘has not been particularly interested or vigilant in enforcement . . . .’”); Nick
Thornton, Who Will Enforce the DOL Rule?, BENEFITS PRO (June 1, 2016, 4:04 AM),
https://www.benefitspro.com/2016/06/01/who-will-enforce-the-dol-rule/?page_all=1&slreturn=
20190322155333 [https://perma.cc/WH7T-R6ES] (“Borzi acknowledged what critics of DOL argued
throughout the regulatory process—‘the DOL does not have direct enforcement authority’ over
IRAs. . . That means the BIC exemption will not be enforceable relative to IRAs through statutory
rules . . . .”).
96. See Mark Schoeff Jr., Trump Administration Targets Class-Action Right in DOL Fiduciary Rule, but
Other Legal Avenues Could Remain for Investors, INV. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:08 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170831/FREE/170839980/trump-administrationtargets-class-action-right-in-dol-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/W9K8-NH5F] (observing state contract
law as the appropriate means available for individual retirement account holders to seek remedy against
investment professionals who violate the fiduciary standard); Thornton, supra note 95 (“Absent the
statutory authority, the BIC exemptions will have to be enforced through private legal action, or as
Borzi put it, ‘the consumer has to enforce the rules through state contract actions.’”).
97. See Schoeff Jr., supra note 96 (according to attorney Joshua Lichtenstein, “[t]he actionable
claims could differ from state-to-state. That could mean some behavior is a breach of fiduciary duty
to an IRA in one state but not in another.”). Compare Wasserman v. Kay, 14 A.3d 1193, 1219
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“In a claim for monetary damages at law, however, an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty may give rise to a cause of action, but it does not, standing alone, constitute a cause of
action.”), with Snyder v. Cowell, No. 08-01-00444-CV, 2003 WL 1849145, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso
Apr. 10, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the existence in Texas of a breach of fiduciary duty cause of
action), and Daugherty v. Ray, No. 01-00-00311-CV, 2002 WL 501592, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 4, 2002, no pet.) (“A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in Texas refers to
unfairness in the contract . . . .”).
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B. Vacating the Hugler Decision
Following the election of President Donald Trump in November 2016,
the financial services industry saw a renewed opportunity to pressure the
incoming Administration to revoke the Fiduciary Rule.98 On February 3,
2017, only days before the Hugler decision, President Trump issued a
memorandum directing the Department of Labor to conduct a full review
of the Fiduciary Rule and its impact on American investors.99 The directive
by President Trump did not order the Rule to be revoked in its entirety,
suggesting the Administration was willing to permit the existing judicial
challenges taking place to run their course.100 Resultingly, the Presidential
Memorandum would require the Department of Labor to propose a new
rule to terminate or revise the existing Obama-era rule.101 Amongst the
backdrop of lobbying, a Presidential Memorandum, and the federal district
court ruling upholding the Rule, the United States Chamber of Commerce
filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
late February 2017.102
On March 15, 2018, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion on whether the

98. See Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, Wall Street Accepts (but Lobbies Against) the Fiduciary
Rule, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/wall-street-accepts-n57982087610/
[https://perma.cc/72G4-LW5W] (reflecting how financial firms are working towards compliance with
the Fiduciary Rule while lobbying against it to the government); see also Jessica Karmasek, Trump
Administration Sued Over Delay of Fiduciary Rule, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/11/01/trump-administration-sued-over-delay-of-fiduciary-rule/#228
e43847501 [http://perma.cc/8Y7Z-6V5K] (recalling American Oversight Executive Director Austin
Evers’ position that “[t]he Department of Labor’s attempts to roll back the . . . fiduciary rules are yet
additional examples of how the Trump administration has sided with well-connected businesses . . . .”).
99. See Fiduciary Duty Rule, Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor on the Fiduciary Duty
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675, 9675 (Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Fiduciary Duty Rule Memorandum] (requiring
the Department of Labor to examine whether the Fiduciary Rule had and harmful effects on “the
ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice.”).
100. See Zeke J. Miller & Haley Sweetland Edwards, White House Stalls Obama Administration Rule
on Retirement Advisors, TIME (Feb. 3, 2017), http://time.com/4659152/donald-trump-fiduciary-ruleretirement-financial-advisers/ [https://perma.cc/6FQM-PDYA] (“The executive order for the
regulatory review is largely symbolic, merely directing agencies and the Financial Stability Oversight
Council to begin a regulatory review process.”).
101. See Fiduciary Duty Rule Memorandum, supra note 99 (“[I]f you conclude for any other
reason after appropriate review that the Fiduciary Duty Rule is inconsistent . . . then you shall publish
for notice and comment a proposed rule rescinding or revising the Rule . . . .”).
102. Notice of Appeal, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152
(N.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1476-M).
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Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule would be permitted to stand.103 In
short, the Fifth Circuit vacated the Rule in its entirety.104 According to the
majority opinion, the definition of the word “fiduciary” as used by the
Department of Labor was in conflict with how Congress envisioned the
word to be interpreted under section 1002 of ERISA.105 Since Congress
used the term “fiduciary” within the ERISA legislation, the common law
definition is presumed to be used.106 However, Congress also added the
words “to the extent,” which was designed to limit the definition, not
expand it as the Department of Labor intended to do.107 The court
suggested that it would defer to the use of words used by Congress in
enacting the ERISA legislation rather than rely on the subjective
interpretation of another administrative agency.108
Of greater consequence within the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, the court
found the Fiduciary Rule to be unreasonable in nature.109 Although several
of these unreasonable factors are discussed, there are two that will shape the
future construction of best interest and fiduciary standards. First, state
103. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 360 (5th Cir.
2018).
104. Id. at 363.
105. According to ERISA, a fiduciary is defined as:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in
the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person designated under
section 1105(c)(1)(B) of this title.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1978); see U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 885 F.3d at 369 (“We conclude that DOL’s interpretation of an ‘investment advice fiduciary’
relies too narrowly on a purely semantic construction of one isolated provision and wrongly
presupposes that the provision is inherently ambiguous.”).
106. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d at 369–70 (discussing the presumption of the common
law meaning of the word “fiduciary” when used by Congress).
107. See id. at 371(“That Congress did not place ‘fiduciary’ in quotation marks indicates
Congress’s decision that the common law meaning was self-explanatory, and it accordingly addressed
fiduciary status for ERISA purposes in terms of enumerated functions.” (citing John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1993))); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
510 U.S. at 96–97 (explaining phrases such as “to the extent that” should be viewed as limiting phrases).
108. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d at 372–73 (arguing Congress was fully aware of the words
it used to construct ERISA legislation and could have written the legislation in any manner it saw fit).
109. Id. at 380.
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private rights of action were not created by the BICE since only Congress
may confer that right, agreeing with the Chamber of Commerce’s position
in the earlier federal district court case in which it argued the Sandoval
standard should apply.110 The court further reasoned that if the BICE did
create a state private right of action, then it was nothing more than an
attempt by the Department of Labor to circumvent Congress’s rulemaking
authority.111
The second unreasonable factor of the Fiduciary Rule given by the
Fifth Circuit was that the Department of Labor ran afoul of the powers
granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by the 2010
Dodd-Frank Act.112 According to the court, it was indeed Dodd-Frank
that empowered “the SEC to promulgate enhanced, uniform standards of
conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers[.]”113 The SEC was
deemed to be the governing body having greater expertise in regulating the
financial services industry, with the Department of Labor being in a position
of supporting any SEC regulatory initiatives.114 Under section 913 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC was granted authority to develop a best interest
standard as it deems appropriate.115 Remarkably, while the Fifth Circuit
vacated the Department of Labor’s attempt to institute a fiduciary rule and
best interest standards for financial professionals, it clearly left open the
door for the SEC to develop similar standards.116
110. Id. at 384 (“Only Congress may create privately enforceable rights, and agencies are
empowered only to enforce the rights Congress creates.” (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
291 (2001))).
111. Id. (claiming statutory authorization is the only means by which a lawsuit could be brought
in either federal or state court).
112. See id. at 385 (observing the Fiduciary Rule was the result of the “DOL’s decision to
outflank two Congressional initiatives to secure further oversight of broker/dealers handling IRA
investments and the sale of fixed-indexed annuities.”).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 385–86 (“Rather than infringing on SEC turf, DOL ought to have deferred to
Congress’s very specific Dodd-Frank delegations and conferred with and supported SEC practices to
assist IRA and all other individual investors.”).
115. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (codified as 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-11 (2018)). According to
section 913(g)(1), “[T]he Commission may promulgate rules to provide that the standard of care for all
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers . . . shall be to act in the best interest of the customer . . . .” Id.
116. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d at 386 (“DOL’s direct imposition on the delegation to
SEC is made plain by the text of Dodd-Frank Section 913(g)(2) . . . .”).
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VI. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
REGULATION BEST INTEREST
A. Overview of Regulation Best Interest
One month following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Chamber of Commerce,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a rule entitled
Regulation Best Interest (Regulation BI)117 that would govern the conduct
of those who provide investment advice to retail consumers.118 In
developing its proposed rule, the SEC considered the impact the
Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule would have on investors and the
financial services industry.119 Regulation BI seeks to address the concerns
over standards of care among financial professionals by incorporating
concepts from the Department of Labor’s BICE provision within the
Fiduciary Rule.120 With the preceding in mind, the SEC appears to be
responding to the calls of the financial services industry to develop a rule
that is fair to both consumers and investment professionals alike.121
Regulation BI seeks to improve on the restrictive language found in the
Fiduciary Rule while expanding the scope of who and what type of
117. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
118. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Enhance Protections and
Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their Relationships with Investment Professionals, (Apr. 18,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-68 [https://perma.cc/BU4B-GBJM] (“Under
proposed Regulation Best Interest, a broker-dealer would be required to act in the best interest of a
retail customer when making a recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy
involving investment securities to a retail customer.”).
119. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,583 (“We also considered the regulatory
landscape applicable to broker-dealers under the Exchange Act and SRO rules and the investor
protections provided when broker-dealers recommend securities . . . and any differences between
those protections . . . particularly those that would exist under the DOL Fiduciary Rule . . . .”).
120. See id. at 21,589 (“We believe that the principles underlying our proposed best interest
obligation as discussed above, and the specific Disclosure, Care, and Conflict of Interest Obligations
described in more detail below, generally draw from underlying principles similar to the principles
underlying the DOL’s best interest standard, as described by the DOL in the BIC Exemption.”); see
also Mark M. Goldberg, How the SEC Advice Rule Improves on the DOL Fiduciary Rule, INV. NEWS (May 29,
2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180529/BLOG09/180529924/howthe-sec-advice-rule-improves-on-the-dol-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/2PGL-4RGU] (stating
portions of the SEC proposed rule are based on work previously completed by the DOL).
121. See Rebecca Moore, DOL, SEC Both Have Fiduciary Conduct Standards Slated for Next Year,
PLAN ADVISER (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.planadviser.com/dol-sec-fiduciary-conduct-standardsslated-next-year/ [https://perma.cc/9PQN-HCQ8] (“The retirement plan and adviser industry has
long called for the DOL and SEC to work together on a new fiduciary—or conflict-of-interest rule.”).
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recommendations should be covered under a best interest standard.122
Regulation BI, as currently proposed, is designed to hold any individual or
financial institution who provides investment advice to retail consumers—
regardless of account type—to a heightened standard.123 This standard
holds the provider to three obligations: 1) disclosure, 2) care, and 3) conflict
of interest.124 Although Regulation BI imposes these obligations and does
not directly confer a fiduciary standard on investment professionals, it also
“does not clearly define ‘best interest’” while still requiring a duty to the
customer.125 The ambiguity presented within the definition will leave the
proposed rule subject to interpretation by consumers and eventually
courts.126
B. The Disclosure Obligation
The first obligation under Regulation BI is one of disclosure. Under the
disclosure obligation, when an investment professional makes a
recommendation, they are required to “disclose to the retail customer, in
writing, the material facts relating to the scope and terms of the relationship
with the retail customer and all material conflicts of interest associated
with the recommendation.”127 With respect to “scope and terms of the
122. See PwC Fin. Servs. Reg. Prac., Five Key Points from the SEC’s “Best Interest” Rule Proposal,
PWC: FIRST TAKE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatoryservices/publications/assets/pwc-sec-best-interest-rule-proposal.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR2J-DC46]
(explaining the SEC’s rule will cover all investment recommendations made to retail customers but will
not yield on restrictions as to how investment professionals are compensated).
123. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,575. The proposed rule states:
That all broker-dealers and natural persons who are associated persons of a broker-dealer (unless
otherwise indicated, together referred to as ‘‘broker-dealer’’), when making a recommendation of
any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities to a retail customer, act in
the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is made without placing
the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer or natural person who is an associated person
making the recommendation ahead of the interest of the retail customer (‘‘Regulation Best
Interest’’).
Id.
124. Id. at 21,585.
125. See PwC Fin. Servs. Reg. Prac., supra note 122, (noting Regulation BI provides little to no
explanation as to the meaning of “best interest”).
126. See id. (“While many broker-dealers may be pleased with the limited changes, retail
customers may face more confusion than clarity without an explicitly defined standard.”).
127. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,599.
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relationship,” the SEC envisions a policy where broker-dealers disclose to
the customer the capacity in which the investment professional is making a
recommendation. In furthering this vision, a requirement exists that seeks
to explain all costs associated not only to the recommendation but also to
the accounts held by the customer with the broker-dealer.128 Finally, under
this proposition, the broker-dealer is required to disclose the nature of the
services provided on the investment account, such as whether ongoing
monitoring of investment performance is taking place.129
Within the disclosure obligation is the requirement that all disclosures be
made to the consumer in writing in an attempt to reduce investor
confusion.130 The writing, also known as the “Relationship Summary,”
would detail all the information necessary for an investor to have in making
a decision about working with the financial institution.131 This information
includes “the services, fees, conflicts, and disciplinary history of firms and
financial professionals they are considering, along with references and links
to other disclosure where interested investors can find more detailed
information.”132 Of note is the requirement to deliver the writing at the
time the consumer either enters into an investment advisory agreement or
when first utilizing a broker-dealer’s services.133 While the SEC does not
explicitly call the writing a contract, if it is incorporated as part of an
investment advisory agreement or is a condition of engaging a customer in
a financial relationship, it does leave to question whether it could be
considered an enforceable agreement between two parties. Furthermore,
the silence within Regulation Best Interest on this issue leads to the
possibility that a breach of the writing could be contested in a court of law.
C. The Care Obligation
The second obligation proposed under Regulation BI is the care
obligation.134 Within this obligation resides an expectation that financial
professionals will “exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence”

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 21,600 (“This Disclosure Obligation also forms an important part of a broader
effort to address retail investor confusion . . . .”).
131. See id. (detailing the overriding purpose of the Relationship Summary).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 21,608.
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when making investment recommendations.135 These expectations apply
to three distinct areas of the recommendation process. First, the investment
professional must reasonably believe that based on a risk–and–reward
analysis, a recommendation that is in the best interest for a particular
segment of clients is being made.136 Second, using an investment profile
for the specific customer, the professional must reasonably believe the
recommendation is in the best interest of said customer.137 Finally, there
must be a reasonable basis to conclude that a series of recommendations is
not excessive and is in the customer’s best interest.138
Notably, the SEC appears to pay deference to the Impartial Conduct
Standard under the Fiduciary Rule in crafting language for the care
obligation.139 The SEC interpreted the BICE within the Department of
Labor rule to apply a standard of care requiring investment-advice
fiduciaries to conduct themselves as impartial professionals.140
Furthermore, the SEC stated—regarding the BICE—that “[t]he fiduciary
must adhere to an objective professional standard and is subject to a
particularly stringent standard of prudence when they have a conflict of
interest.”141 The influence of the Fiduciary Rule language is apparent when
the SEC explains the “proposed Care Obligation establishes an objective,
professional standard of conduct for broker-dealers that requires brokerdealers to ‘exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill and prudence[.]’”142
One can infer the SEC is tying the care obligation directly to the duties set
forth under the Fiduciary Rule. This nearly duplicative language by the SEC
clearly suggests that if a financial professional violates the standard of care
they are in danger of breach of a fiduciary duty to the customer.

135. Id.
136. See id. (suggesting recommendations should be generally accepted amongst a larger group
of investors).
137. See id. (explaining the reasonable basis determination for an individual investor is
dependent on an investment profile).
138. See id. (noting investment professionals have an obligation to ensure that a series of
transactions are not excessive in nature).
139. See id. at 21,614 (“[W]e believe the proposed Care Obligation generally reflects similar
underlying principles as the ‘objective standards of care’ that are incorporated in the best interest
Impartial Conduct Standard as set forth by the DOL in the BIC Exemption.”).
140. See id. (providing the SEC’s interpretation into the DOL’s meaning of standard of care).
141. Id. at 21,615.
142. Id.
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D. The Conflict of Interest Obligation
The final obligation under Regulation BI is the conflict of interest
obligation. There are two requirements to the obligation that apply directly
to financial institutions.143 First, the company must maintain written
policies and procedures disclosing material conflicts of interest as they relate
to the recommendations being made to customers.144 Second, financial
companies must disclose any financial incentives resulting from the sale of
a recommendation.145 The conflict of interest obligation does appear to be
the most flexible of the three as it permits financial institutions to make their
own decision on which conflicts of interest to disclose.146 In addition, the
SEC is encouraging broker-dealers to develop compliance systems that fit
within their own business model.147
E. Pathway to Litigating Violations of Regulation Best Interest in State Court
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 granted federal courts
jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Act.148 Indeed, since inception
of the legislation, courts have ruled consistently that suit for violations
under the Act are subject to federal court jurisdiction.149 However,
143. Id. at 21,617.
144. See id. (describing what is necessary to have a fully compliant company policy on conflicts
of interest).
145. See id. (“[E]stablish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to identify, and disclose and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from
financial incentives associated with such recommendations.”).
146. See id. (stating broker-dealers will “be permitted to exercise their judgment” on whether to
disclose a conflict of interest).
147. See id. at 21,618 (“Use of a risk-based compliance and supervisory system would grant
broker-dealers the flexibility to establish systems that are tailored to their business models . . . .”).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010). The Code reads in part:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
Id.
149. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1211–12 (9th Cir.
1998) (declaring federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enforce the Act); Hawkins v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Sec. Dealers, 149 F.3d 330, 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining federal courts have “broad subject-matter
jurisdiction in the arena of securities regulation”); Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309,
1313 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing provision within the Act that grants federal jurisdiction over violations of
the Act).
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following the announcement of Regulation BI, state governments have
criticized the proposed rule as not going far enough to protect its
citizens.150 As of August 2018, sixteen states including the District of
Columbia commented on the deficiencies within the proposed rule.151
Although it remains to be seen whether states will enact their own best
interest standards, the displeasure amongst state attorneys general indicates
potential state challenges—to the SEC’s rulemaking authority and best
interest standards—should be handled on a state-by-state basis.152
Should direct state challenges to Regulation BI prove to be unsuccessful,
the United States Supreme Court in its 2016 decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning153 may provide an alternative means for states
to protect consumers with respect to the SEC rule.154 In Manning, Greg
Manning brought suit against Merrill Lynch in New Jersey state court
alleging the investment company purposefully devalued the share price of a
NASDAQ traded stock resulting in significant losses for Manning.155
Although Manning cited violations of federal law in his complaint, he also
sought to make claims that Merrill Lynch violated New Jersey state law.156
Merrill Lynch had the case removed to federal court district court, which
ultimately denied Manning’s motion to move the case back to state court.157
Manning argued that even though he brought state-based claims alleging
violations of a federal statute, those claims should be heard in state court.158
The Supreme Court agreed with Manning, holding that state-based claims
are not subject to removal to federal court simple because they reference a

150. See Fiduciary Governance: A Fiduciary’s 2018 Retrospective (and Predictions for 2019), STRADLEY
RONON: RISK&REWARD 2 (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.stradley.com/-/media/files/publications/
2019/01/risk_and_reward_jan7_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA3P-BCHH] (signaling the desire of
the State of Massachusetts to develop its own fiduciary standard in light of the SEC’s proposed rule).
151. See id. at 8 (showing a significant number of states do not believe Regulation BI will
sufficiently protect their citizens).
152. See id. at 9 (“While regulations may face better odds than legislation, they also remain
vulnerable to court challenge that the regulator acted beyond its powers.”).
153. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016).
154. See id. (holding state court had proper jurisdiction over Manning’s claims against an
investment company).
155. Id. at 1566.
156. Id. at 1566–67.
157. Id. at 1567.
158. Id. at 1569.
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violation of federal statute.159 As a result of the Manning decision, a
possibility now exists for consumers to bring causes of action such as breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and other state-based deceptive trade
practices claims against Regulation BI in state courts without fear of removal
over a federal jurisdictional question.
VII. LITIGATING VIOLATIONS OF REGULATION BEST INTEREST
UNDER STATE COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Breach of Contract
Since the Hugler court suggested the breach of a fiduciary agreement
between a retirement investor and advisor amounts to no more than a
breach of contract, the investor would need to bring a common law cause
of action in state court.160 In a breach of contract cause of action, the
plaintiff maintains the burden of proving (1) that a valid contract did exist
between the parties, (2) there was performance of the contract on behalf of
the plaintiff, (3) a breach occurred by the defendant, and (4) the plaintiff
incurred damages.161 State courts have universally recognized these
elements in breach of contract cases.162 Considering the intent of ERISA,
the Fiduciary Rule, and Regulation BI was to create a uniform code of
conduct in the financial services industry and standardize the means of
recovery for aggrieved investors, the acceptance of these breach of contract
elements may aid the SEC in reaching its stated objectives.

159. See id. at 1574 (“[W]e will not lightly read the statute to alter the usual constitutional
balance, as it would by sending actions with all state-law claims to federal court just because a complaint
references a federal duty.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein , 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996)
(“While § 27 prohibits state courts from adjudicating claims arising under the Exchange Act, it does
not prohibit state courts from approving the release of Exchange Act claims in the settlement of suits
over which they have properly exercised jurisdiction . . . .”).
160. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 181–82 (N.D. Tex.
2017), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018).
161. Abbit v. ING USA Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
162. See id. (recognizing the four elements of a breach of contract cause of action in California);
Smith v. Jones, 497 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ill. 1986) (highlighting four elements a plaintiff must prove for
breach of contract in Illinois); Kronos, Inc., v. AVX Corp., 612 N.E.2d 289, 292 (N.Y. 1993) (noting
four elements to a New York breach of contract cause of action); Hussong v. Schwan’s Sales Enters.,
Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding there are four main
elements to breach of contract cases in Texas). But see J.J. Gumberg Co. v. Janis Servs., 847 So. 2d
1048, 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (stating a breach of contract cause of action in Florida has three
elements consisting of: 1) the existence of a contract; 2) breach; and 3) damages).
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While Regulation BI creates predictability for consumers by holding
retirement advisors to potential contractual obligations, it may also establish
a limiting effect for the amount of damages a plaintiff receives. Under the
common law, plaintiffs in breach of contract cases may recover actual
damages.163 Those damages necessarily arise as a result of the conduct of
the defendant.164 In the case of retirement accounts, damages resulting
from the conduct of a financial advisor are those attributable to investment
loss as a result of poor advice. For higher net worth investors these dollar
amounts could be substantial; however, smaller account holders would more
likely not be in a position to litigate their claims, as the damage sought is
typically less than the cost associated with litigation.165 In addition, breach
of contract causes of action generally do not allow for the award of punitive
damages.166 Once again, small investors will find themselves in a position
where they will pay more in litigation costs than damages received, all while
attempting to convince attorneys to work on their behalf where there is little
incentive to do so.167
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
If Regulation BI imposes a fiduciary obligation on behalf of financial
professionals, and the Manning court places the responsibility to hear cases
in which the proposed rule has been violated at the state level, one could
expect consumers to bring common law breach of fiduciary duty causes of
action. Like breach of contract, a breach of fiduciary duty requires a plaintiff
to prove a number of elements.168 For a claimant to recover, it must be
shown that (1) both the plaintiff and defendant had a fiduciary relationship,
(2) the relationship was breached by the defendant, and (3) damages
163. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2006).
164. See Mead v. Johnson Grp., Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. 1981) (“In an action for breach
of contract, actual damages may be recovered when loss is the natural, probable, and foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”)
165. See John L. Hill, Introduction, 8 ST. MARY’S L.J. 609, 610 (1977) (noting the remedies
available to consumers are limited by contract clauses written by corporations and the high costs of
bringing breach of contract claims to court under an unconscionability standard).
166. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986).
167. But see Hill, supra note 165, at 614 (“[T]he new DTPA addressed the second hurdle—the
disincentive to litigate arising from the imbalance between the high cost and practical difficulties of
litigation and the small ‘actual’ damages characteristic of most consumer claims.”).
168. Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet denied).
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occurred as a result of the breach.169 Once again, most states have
universally accepted these elements.170
Although there is agreement on what constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty cause of action amongst state courts, there is a split as to whether those
who provide financial advice actually have a fiduciary duty.171 The Texas
Court of Appeals, in Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben,172 is
particularly instructive as to how Texas courts should consider these types
of cases.173 Timothy Hutton was a financial advisor who was licensed to
sell products with Intersecurities.174 He was approached by David Graben,
a retired American Airlines pilot, in 1999 to discuss the possibility of
managing Graben’s retirement assets.175 After conducting a financial
interview with Graben, Hutton invested $2.5 million of Graben’s assets in a
variable annuity with Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of
Ohio.176 Hutton earned a commission on the sale and held himself out as
the individual who would monitor the performance of the account on behalf
Over a five-year period, the investment earned
of Graben.177
approximately 1% per year.178 Frank Strickler, another retired American
Airlines pilot who worked with and experienced a similar outcome in his
relationship with Hutton, also joined the suit.179 Graben and Strickler
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty based on the advice they received from
169. Id.; see also Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.3d 482, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
pet denied) (detailing three distinct elements for a breach of fiduciary duty claim (citing Blume,
196 S.W.3d 440)).
170. See Baker v. Family Credit Counseling Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392, 414–15 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(listing the elements for breach of fiduciary duty in Pennsylvania); Oasis W. Realty, LLC., v. Goldman,
250 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal. 2011) (highlighting elements for breach of fiduciary duty in California);
Lawlor v. N. Amendment Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414, 433 (Ill. 2012) (outlining breach of fiduciary
duty elements in Illinois); Blume,196 S.W.3d at 447 (explaining Texas breach of fiduciary duty elements).
But see Rendahl v. Peluso, 162 A.3d 1, 22 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017) (noting there are four elements to a
breach of fiduciary duty case in Connecticut).
171. Compare W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360, 373–74
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (finding the existence of a fiduciary duty by an individual who
provides financial advice in Texas), with Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 548
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (finding financial advice did not create a fiduciary relationship in Alabama).
172. W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2007, no pet.).
173. See id. at 373–74 (discussing when financial advice creates a fiduciary duty).
174. Id. at 363–64.
175. Id. at 364.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 365.
178. Id. at 366.
179. Id. at 366–67.
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Hutton.180 The court found that unsophisticated investors who trust those
to make appropriate investments on their behalf create more than an arm’slength transaction.181 Furthermore, those who hold themselves out as
financial advisors have a duty to continuously review client accounts and to
assume the role of a fiduciary.182
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, in Production Credit Ass’n v. Croft,183
took a slightly different approach than the Texas courts as to whether
financial advice confers a fiduciary duty on an individual.184 Roger Croft,
who operated a farm, sought a loan with Production Credit Association
(PCA) in 1980.185 He applied for additional loans in 1983 and 1984 to help
pay for costs associated with operating his farm.186 When PCA moved to
foreclose on real estate mortgages used to secure the 1984 loans, Croft filed
a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty.187 He maintained that
because he was a farmer he lacked the knowledge and sophistication
required to make a sound lending decision, forcing him to rely on PCA for
guidance.188 While the court acknowledged a fiduciary duty can be created
by contract, the mere existence of the contract does not establish a fiduciary
duty.189 Of greater consequence is the court’s analysis of when a fiduciary
duty is implied in law.190 The court may consider a number of factors,
including age, education, and business experience, to determine whether an
individual seeking financial advice is in a subservient position to whomever

180. Id. at 368.
181. See id. at 374 (“The relationship goes well beyond a traditional arms’-length business
transaction that provides ‘mutual benefit’ for both parties.”).
182. See id. (“Simply put, when Hutton assumes the role to act as a financial advisor to the
Clients and to monitor and manage their investments, any arms’-length business transaction that may
have existed between the parties was elevated by the very nature of Hutton’s actions.”).
183. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
184. See id. at 549 (holding there was no fiduciary duty created when financial advice was given).
185. Id. at 545.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 546.
189. See id. at 546–47 (explaining the terms and obligations of the parties within the contract
will determine whether a fiduciary duty has been established).
190. See id. at 547 (“A fiduciary relationship arises from a formal commitment to act for the
benefit of another . . . or from special circumstance from which the law will assume an obligation to
act for another’s benefit.” (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Boeck, 377 N.W.2d
605 (Wis. 1985))).
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is providing the advice.191 As this decision relates to the Department of
Labor Fiduciary Rule, investors may not be able to rely solely on the
argument that their lack of education on investments automatically creates
a fiduciary duty on behalf of their financial advisor.192
VIII. DO STATE STATUTORY SCHEMES PROVIDE CONSUMER RELIEF?
A. Advantages of a State Statutory Cause of Action
A number of states have adopted statutory frameworks to address the
issue of deceptive trade practices committed against consumers.193
Considering the intent of Regulation BI is to curb improper sales practices
within the retirement-advice industry, these statutory provisions may
provide a better alternative for consumers to seek relief.194 While common
law theories of recovery typically entail plaintiffs proving multiple elements,
such as intent and reliance, deceptive trade practice statutes provide
consumers with more favorable treatment by courts in eliminating these
requirements.195 Those seeking to bring suit for violations of Regulation
191. See id. (stating the criteria that a court may use to determine the existence of a subservient
position).
192. See id. at 548 (“Debtors should not be allowed to rely blindly on advice given by a lender
and hold the lender responsible for its losses if the advice, with the benefit of hindsight, is not
appropriate.” (quoting Steven C. Bahls, Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender
Liability, 48 MONT. L. REV. 213 (1987))); Boeck, 377 N.W.2d at 609 (“A fiduciary relationship does not
arise merely because a broker offers advice and counsel upon which a customer has a right to place
trust and confidence.”).
193. See Amy Algiers Anderson, Note, State Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Acts:
Should Wisconsin Lawyers Be Susceptible to Liability under Section 100.20?, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 497 (1999)
(highlighting the various states who have enacted statutes addressing the problem of deceptive trade
practices); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017) (“As used in this chapter, unfair
competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, and untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 349 (McKinney 2017)
(“Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing
of any service in this state are hereby declared unlawful.”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a)
(“False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful and are subject to action by the consumer protection division . . . .”).
194. See Anderson, supra note 193, at 497 (“Although these statues vary from state to state and
may be modeled after different federal acts, they all have the same basic purpose—to protect the public
from unfair or deceptive acts or practices with respect to the sale of goods or services.”).
195. Compare Michael C. Gilleran, The Rise of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act Claims, A.B.A.
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/fall2011unfair-deceptive-trade-practice-act-claims.html [https://perma.cc/BXB8-SHKS] (noting common law
causes of action, such as fraud, generally require “intent to deceive and proof of reliance” to be shown
by plaintiffs), with Hill, supra note 165, at 613 (“By extending to the consumer the same cause of action
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BI using a statutory framework would not be required to prove a financial
professional intended to deceive, but rather only need to show that the
advisor had the capacity to deceive.196 The obligations of disclosure, care,
and conflicts of interest under Regulation BI could provide the backdrop
for a successful consumer lawsuit, as any perceived violation of those
obligations, regardless of whether an actual deceptive act occurred, would
be subject to a claim.197
The ability to collect increased damage amounts also makes a lawsuit
under a deceptive trade practices act cause of action more attractive to
investors. State statutory models typically allow a consumer to create a
multiplier effect, known as treble damages, when calculating damages owed
for a claim.198 Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff
can recover up to three times the economic damages incurred for a knowing
violation committed by a defendant.199 For a financial advisor or
institution, the prospect of increased economic or punitive damages creates
a powerful incentive to settle claims with investors and prevent future cases

for deceptive practices formerly available only to the attorney general, the DTPA substantially lightened
the burden of proof required of the consumer in common law actions for fraud.”).
196. See Hill, supra note 165, at 613 (explaining capacity and tendency replace the requirement
of intent as necessary elements to a deceptive trade practice cause of action); Gilleran, supra note 195
(“Moreover, the representation does not have to be literally false; all that has to be shown is that the
representation was likely to deceive, or even that it just has the capacity or tendency to deceive.”).
197. See Hill, supra note 165, at 613 (“If the conduct could mislead the ‘ignorant, the unthinking
and the credulous,’ it violates the law.”); see also Gilleran, supra note 195 (“For example, UDTPAs
expand liability to include unfair conduct . . . . and often causes courts to characterize UDTPAs as
‘statute[s] of broad impact which create[ ] new substantive rights’ and as ‘making conduct unlawful
which was not unlawful under the common law or any prior statute.’” (alterations in original)).
198. See Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998)
(highlighting “the extraordinary damages authorized by the UTPA” in North Carolina); Kenai Chrysler
Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1259 (Alaska 2007) (noting under Alaska statute prevailing
plaintiffs are entitled to three times actual damages); PPG Indus. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd.
P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Tex. 2004) (explaining the Texas DTPA provides for treble damages);
Gilleran, supra note 195 (“They provide for an award of either a multiple of actual damages, or
unlimited punitive damages, to a prevailing plaintiff.”).
199. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50. Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Relief for Consumers provision “[i]f the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was
committed knowingly, the consumer may also recover damages for mental anguish, as found by the
trier of fact, and the trier of fact may award not more than three times the amount of economic
damage[.]” Id. § 17.50(b)(1); see also Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex.
2006) (holding plaintiff could recover three times economic damages for a DTPA violation).
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of abuse.200 Furthermore, these damage awards would disincentive
financial companies from engaging in material conflicts of interest, knowing
the costs of doing so outweigh any perceived benefit. In the end, the
awarding of damages under a deceptive trade practice statutory framework
assists the SEC in achieving its goals under Regulation BI.201
Many states with deceptive trade practice statutory frameworks allow for
the collection of attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff.202 Common law
causes of action, with the exception of breach of contract, typically do not
permit plaintiffs to be paid attorney’s fees by losing defendants.203 On the
other hand, the awarding of attorney’s fees are in many instances deemed to
be mandatory.204 Similar to treble damages, allowing plaintiffs to collect
attorney’s fees provides an incentive for attorneys to litigate cases where a
violation of the Fiduciary Rule has occurred, especially those involving
smaller dollar amounts.205
B. Proving Consumer Status
Although suits brought under a statutory cause of action provide fewer
hurdles for retirement investors to overcome in litigating their claims, there
are issues that should give consumers pause for concern. A common
element that must be shown by plaintiffs in deceptive trade practice theories
of recovery is whether the plaintiff is considered a consumer under a

200. See Gilleran, supra note 195 (reviewing the intent of multiple and punitive damage awards
under state deceptive trade practice statutes); see also Denison, 167 P.3d at 1260 (“The legislative history
of Alaska’s provision establishes that treble damages were adopted not just to deter fraud, but also to
encourage injured parties to file suits under the UTPA and to ensure that they would be adequately
compensated for their efforts.”).
201. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,617 (May 9, 2018) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing the intent behind the Conflict of Interest Obligation).
202. Gilleran, supra note 195.
203. See Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 311 (“Absent a contract or statute, trial courts do not
have inherent authority to require a losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.” (citing Travelers
Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding))); Gilleran, supra
note 195 (discussing the “American Rule” in which plaintiffs could not collect attorney’s fees and were
ultimately responsible for paying their own fees).
204. See TEX. BUS. & COM. § 17.50(d) (“Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court
costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.”); see also Gilleran, supra note 195 (citing state case
law where the award of attorney’s fees was deemed to be mandatory).
205. See Hill, supra note 165, at 610 (revealing as an attorney in private practice before the
development of state statutory frameworks John Hill turned down numerous cases due to the high
costs associated with litigation).
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statutory definition.206 To establish consumer status, a plaintiff either has
to seek or actually acquire goods or services through purchase.207
Furthermore, the good or service purchased must form the basis of the
plaintiff’s complaint against the defendant.208 As contemplated by the
Department of Labor’s regulatory action, for example, the purpose of the
Fiduciary Rule was to improve the level of service retirement investors
received by standardizing the financial advice process.209 If aggrieved
investors are to pursue claims against financial advisors for poor financial
advice, it will be important for those investors to establish whether the
advice received constitutes a service under a state deceptive trade practice
statute.
The United States District Court for the Southern Division, in Cobb v.
Miller,210 addressed the issue of when financial advice is considered a
service.211 Joey Miller conducted investment trading workshops to the
public on behalf of his company, Traders Edge, Inc., in February 2010.212
Johnny Cobb paid $25,000 to attend a financial summit and receive financial
advice on how to trade stock hosted by Miller.213 During the summit,
Miller made several representations, including that he had a number of years
of industry experience, option trading was a conservative means of
investing, and investors could witness large annual returns without risking
206. Section 17.45(4) under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act defines a consumer as “an
individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or
acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services . . . .” TEX. BUS. & COM. § 17.45(4).
207. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351–52 (Tex. 1987) (“First, the
plaintiffs must have sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or lease.” (citing Sherman Simon
Enters., Inc. v. Lorac Serv. Corp., 724 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. 1987); Cameron v. Terrell & Garett, Inc,
618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981))); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539 (defining consumer status as envisioned
by the Texas statute).
208. See Barnes, 741 S.W.2d at 352 (“Second, the goods or services purchased or leased must
form the basis of the complaint.” (citing Sherman Simon Enters., Inc., 724 S.W.2d at 15; Cameron,
618 S.W.2d at 539)); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539 (holding in order to establish consumer status the
good purchased needs to form the basis of plaintiff’s complaint).
209. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating
the intent of the Fiduciary Rule was to eliminate conflicts of interest that may arise in providing
financial advice).
210. Cobb v. Miller, No. H–12–1943, 2013 WL 12142342 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013).
211. See id. at *4 (addressing scenarios when financial advice is assumed to be a service for the
purpose of establishing consumer status).
212. Id. at *1.
213. Id.
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principal.214 Shortly after the workshop, Miller convinced Cobb to invest
$500,000 in an options trading strategy.215 Between May and June 2010,
Cobb communicated he was having difficulty understanding his account
statements while losing more than $100,000 in his investments.216 Miller
stated the investment account was performing well; however, by November
2010, Cobb lost the entire $500,000 balance.217 In June 2012, Cobb filed
suit against Miller for a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.218 Miller maintained Cobb could not be a consumer since he received
advice, which is not to be considered either a good or service.219 The
district court held that because the advice was purchased, it was the purpose
of the transaction and could be considered a service under Texas statute.220
Earlier cases also examined whether financial advice can be viewed as
service, but from a slightly different perspective. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Munn,221
addressed if activities in connection with the purchase of an intangible could
be construed as a service for the purpose of determining consumer
status.222 Hugh Munn was interested in purchasing stock in a company
named TIDCO.223 Prior to the purchase, a settlement agreement was
negotiated with two shareholders, and Munn agreed to guarantee a loan
issued by Southwest Bank to cover the cost of the agreement.224 TIDCO
subsequently went bankrupt and Munn brought suit for rescission of the
guaranty contract.225 Since Texas law does not recognize intangibles as
goods under its deceptive trade practices statutory framework, Munn would
have to show he purchased bank services to gain consumer status.226 The
Fifth Circuit ultimately held that activities not considered to be the main

214. Id.
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *3.
220. Id. at *4 (holding Cobb purchased advice from Miller and can be considered a consumer).
221. FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1986).
222. See id. at 861 (examining whether the guarantor of a loan purchased bank services as a
consumer under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 861–62.
225. Id. at 862.
226. See id. at 863 (“Since the TIDCO stock and the bank loan are not goods, Munn must
establish that he purchased ‘services’ to qualify as a consumer.”).
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objective of a transaction cannot also be considered services.227
Both Cobb and Munn highlight an important consideration courts will
examine when determining if a retirement investor has a valid complaint of
a violation of the Fiduciary Rule: whether the financial advice provided was
the objective of the transaction or simply incidental in nature.228 As a
means to make this distinction, courts have two potential options. First, if
an investor were to pay for advice from an advisor, a court could find the
advice was the objective of the transaction, as the advisor was getting
compensated directly for that advice.229 Evidence of an ongoing fee-based
relationship for advice or a one-time lump-sum payment would be sufficient
to establish the advice as the objective of the transaction. Second, if the
advice did no more than merely help facilitate the purchase of a product,
such as a stock or annuity, then that advice would not be viewed as the
objective.230 Courts would need to find evidence that the result of an
advisor-investor interaction was one in which the investor purchased a
product.
C. The Professional Services Exemption
An equally problematic issue facing investors who bring suit under a
deceptive trade practice cause of action is the existence of professional
services exemptions within the statutory frameworks.231 This exemption
227. See id. at 864 (“We only hold that where those activities are not the subject of the complaint,
then the presence of such collateral activities in a transaction otherwise not covered by the DTPA does
not subject the parties to liability under the DTPA.” (quoting Riverside Nat’l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d
169, 175 n.5 (Tex. 1980))).
228. See id. (noting not all “activities related to the sale of intangibles” should be considered
services for purposes of conferring consumer status); Cobb v. Miller, No. H–12–1943,
2013 WL 12142342, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013) (detailing the financial advice purchased by Cobb
was the objective of the transaction); First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 929 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1993, writ denied) (“[T]he court held that the key principle in determining consumer status is
that the goods or services purchased must be an objective of the transaction, not merely incidental to it.”
(citing id. at 865)).
229. See Cobb, 2013 WL 12142342, at *4 (“Here, Cobb has likewise pleaded that he purchased
the Miller Defendants’ services for financial and investment advice for the sum of $25,000 . . . It is
clear then that the advice that he allegedly purchased forms the basis of his DTPA claim.”).
230. See Maginn v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no
writ) (highlighting the services provided by Norwest did nothing more than to help facilitate a
customer’s purchase of a mortgage loan).
231. Under Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 17.49(c), “Nothing in this subchapter shall
apply to a claim for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence of which is
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prevents claims against those who provide advice or opinions as part of a
professional service.232 It is an affirmative defense that can be pleaded in
order to defeat a cause of action alleging violations of a deceptive trade
practices statute.233 For an investor to overcome the use of a professional
services exemption by a financial advisor, the investor must demonstrate
any of the following: 1) that a material fact during the rendering of advice
was misrepresented; 2) there was a failure to disclose information; 3) an
unconscionable action occurred that cannot be viewed as advice; or 4) an
express warranty was breached.234 While the burden of proof remains with
the investor to show one of the previous actions took place, most cases
regarding the professional services exemption focus on what defines a
professional service.235
The Texas Court of Appeals, in Atlantic Lloyd’s Insurance Co. of Texas v.
Susman Godfrey, LLP,236 reviewed the issue of whether an act by a
professional constituted a professional service.237 Thomas Adams, an
attorney representing the law firm of Susman Godfrey, LLP., sent a letter to
a patient informing her of the firm’s involvement in a prior lawsuit against
the woman’s physician.238 The law firm was subsequently sued by the
physician and invoked a duty-to-defend provision in their insurance
policy with Atlantic Lloyd’s Insurance Company of Texas (hereinafter,

the providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.49(c).
232. Id.; see Brennan v. Manning, No. 07-06-0041-CV, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Apr. 12, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op) (explaining the definition of a professional services
exemption).
233. See Brennan, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (“The professional services exemption is properly
characterized as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded because it is a plea of confession and
avoidance.” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Head v. U.S. Inspect DFW, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.))).
234. BUS. & COM. § 17.49(c); see Brennan, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (discussing the various ways
a consumer may defeat the personal services exemption affirmative defense).
235. See Atl. Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Godfrey, 982 S.W.2d 472, 476–78 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1998, pet. denied) (reviewing how professional services should be interpreted for the purpose of a
defendant to qualify for the exemption); Omni Metals v. Poe & Brown of Tex. Inc., No. 14-00-01081CV, 2002 WL 1331720, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 13, 2002, pet. denied) (noting the
interpretation Texas courts have used to understand the meeting of professional services).
236. Atl. Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., 982 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1998, pet. denied).
237. See id. at 476–77 (providing a working definition of professional services).
238. Id. at 473–74.
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Atlantic).239 Atlantic claimed there was no duty to defend since the duty in
the insurance policy excluded coverage for any acts related to the rendering
of professional services.240 The court believed that not every act conducted
by a professional necessarily should be considered a professional service.241
In addition, professional services should exclusively include conduct that
uses certain skills only found in the profession.242
Regulation BI, coupled with the professional services exemption,
provides a unique defense for financial advisors against retirement investors.
It is generally understood that financial advisors provide advice to customers
on a number of topics, including long-term goals such as retirement
planning.243 In addition, Regulation BI focuses on recommendations made
by financial professionals and the scope they are delivered in.244 The public
perception of an advisor’s job responsibilities and how Regulation BI
defines the scope of recommendation are strikingly similar to the state
professional services exemption that focuses on “the essence of which is the
providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill.”245
This similarity will allow financial advisors and institutions to argue that any
level of advice provided should be considered a professional service, thus
creating an exemption from suit for a violation of the Fiduciary Rule under
a state statutory framework.

239. Id. at 474.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 477 (reviewing acts that may be incidental to a professional’s daily activities (citing
Bank of Cal., N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981))).
242. See id. (“Professional services are considered those acts which use the inherent skills typified
by that profession, not all acts associated with the profession.” (emphasis in original) (citing Opie,
663 F.2d at 981)); see also Brennan v. Manning, No. 07-06-0041-CV, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Apr. 12, 2007, pet. denied) (“The essence of those legal services was the providing of
advice, judgement, opinion, or similar skill.”).
243. See How to Choose a Financial Planner, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2008, 12:25 PM),
http://guides.wsj.com/personal-finance/managing-your-money/how-to-choose-a-financial-planner/
[https://perma.cc/FZ33-94V9] (“Financial planners advise clients on how best to save, invest, and
grow their money . . . Some specialize in retirement or estate planning, while some others consult on
a range of financial matters.”).
244. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,593 (May 9, 2018) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing the scope of making recommendations within the context of a brokerdealer setting).
245. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(c).
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IX. CONCLUSION
How people have planned for their financial future, especially retirement,
has changed dramatically over the past century. The model of retirement
planning has evolved from one in which retirees relied on the government
for their benefits, to one where the individual is responsible for making
decisions. To help facilitate retirement planning decisions, investors have
turned to a growing field force of financial advisors for guidance. With the
growing desire by the investing public to obtain assistance from a
professional, comes a responsibility by the government to ensure proper
standards are in place to guard against conflicts of interest.
The now-vacated Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule and subsequently
proposed Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation Best Interest are
positive steps in the right direction of holding financial advisors to the same
level of accountability as attorneys or accountants. However, Regulation
BI falls short in fully protecting investors when it comes to litigation of their
claims. It allows financial professionals and institutions too many
opportunities to defeat consumer causes of action against them. In order
to fully protect investors from improper conduct, the SEC will need to
revisit the proposed rule during its comment period and provide additional
measures to ensure to those investors who have been wronged the
opportunity to fairly prosecute their claims.
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